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ABSTRACT
Recent federal legislation has provided the impetus for increasing the role of
competition and market forces in California's electric service utilities
industry. By evaluating proposals submitted by representatives from
interested industry, consumer, and special interest groups, this thesis offers a
comprehensive presentation of the ensuing regulatory restructuring forum.
It identifies the primary points of contention as:
* Transmission Access vs. Engineering Constraints and Control
Requirements
* Cost-of-service vs. Performance-based Regulation
* Direct Retail Access vs. Wholesale Competition Schemes
* Regional Power Pools vs. Bilateral Contracts
In addition, relevant issues include concerns about scheduling, transition
costs, power system management, utilities' traditional obligations to provide
universal service, jurisdictional authority and reciprocity (for those utilities
not subject to California regulation).
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1 Introduction
The United States' electric supply system-which over the past
century has become the world's finest-provides light, heat, and power to
nearly every American at an exceptional level of reliability, safety, and
performance. The system was developed largely as an integrated industry,
with local utilities constructing and owning the generation, transmission,
and distribution systems needed to meet customer demands. Today, that
traditional, vertically-integrated structure is changing, and California is
paving the way. If adopted, the California Public Utilities Commission's
Order Instituting Rulemaking (OIR) on the regulatory reform of California's
electric utilities would result in a dramatic step towards achieving a new
industry structure where competition and market forces play greater roles.
The main goal of reform is to reduce utility rates in the states by allowing
direct customer access to an open number of electricity suppliers ("direct
access") and by the restructuring of rates according to a complex system called
performance-based ratemaking.
The proposal is motivated by a long-standing national policy to
overhaul major industries such as telecommunications, natural gas
pipelines, and electric supply. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (PURPA) encouraged the development of power plants fueled by
renewable resources or by more efficient cogeneration technology. It created a
new class of generators, commonly called Qualifying Facilities (QFs). In the
fifteen years which have followed, a robust and competitive independent
power production industry has emerged. According to the March 1992 report
"California's Electric Services Industry: Perspectives on the Past, Strategies for
the Future," QF power currently accounts for nearly "20% of investor-owned
utility supplies in the state and QFs supplied about 56% of all new generation
brought on-line in California since 1982."l In addition, consumers are
benefiting from lower prices through the competitive wholesale markets that
have been facilitated by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and by various regional
pools.
1"California PUC report sees utility exit from generation as reform option," Independent Power
Report (February 26, 1993), Section: Rates & Regulation, p. 19.
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Nonetheless, the highly differentiated nature of electric services
remains mostly obscured by the way utilities and current rate regulation
"bundle" and price the services. Regulatory reform must begin by
"unbundling" and allowing competitors to find not only new, more efficient
ways to provide electricity but also new and different services to meet
consumers' needs. The situation with electric utilities finds analogs in other
industries. At the outset of telephone service deregulation, few probably
foresaw the level of differentiation which is currently available to consumers
in that business. Rates now vary based on time and amount of use.
Customers can also choose levels of reliability-buying service on cheaper
lines when available in lieu of more expensive routing. Additionally, the
airline industry offers a variety of options with respect to reliability ("standby"
vs. "reserved" status), quality of service (first class, business class, or coach),
timing of travel, and volume discounts for return business (frequent flyer
programs).
The OIR envisions a world where all electric power users will be
able to purchase electricity directly from competing suppliers. At the same
time, it recognizes that the transition to this competitive marketplace will be
difficult and must be managed with care in order that many of the benefits of
the current system are not lost. There are also fundamental legal,
jurisdictional, and public policy issues which will need to be resolved in
addition to reconciling the conflicting interests between the various parties
involved. Since the April 20, 1994 issuance of the OIR, the California Public
Utilities Commission ("Commission" or CPUC) has held five full panel
hearings and fourteen statewide hearings to solicit the advice of the public,
stakeholders, and industry experts on the subject of the Rulemaking. The
discussion has been intense, with numerous parties offering support of the
Commission's proposal and others registering serious concerns about the
future described by the CPUC. Rarely has a piece of regulatory policy received
such nationwide-even worldwide-attention from utilities, legislators,
environmentalists, academic economists, and consumers alike.
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1.1 Justifications for reform
In an attempt to meet growing demand without significant rate
increases, utilities have resorted to purchasing power instead of building new
power plants. Still, at the September 16, 1994 full panel hearing,
Commissioner P. Gregory Conlon remarked that California's electric utility
rates are currently 150% of the national average.2 Although some of this
differential might in fact be attributed to QF contracts as well as to state
electricity conservation programs, the marginal cost of generating new
electricity is still significantly lower than the average cost of today's providers.
The present regulatory system offers weak incentives for California's
investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to operate and invest efficiently, and it
requires costly, administratively burdensome proceedings. 3
"Revenues of the state's IOUs exceeded $18 billion in 1993,
representing approximately 2 percent of California's gross state product. The
majority of California businesses, which make up the remaining ninety-eight
percent of California's almost $800 billion economy, depend heavily on
reliable, safe and competitively-priced electric service."4 Needless to say, all
consumers would benefit greatly if the electric utility industry was forced to
optimize its operations, decrease its costs and share the savings. Lower rates
also increase affordability and fewer customers would have reason to be
delinquent in their payments. "In a competitive power market, rate
differences should be reduced to a level reflecting only the marginal cost
differences of producing additional increments of power and the cost
associated with its transmission from one location to another."5
2 Reporter's Transcript, California Public Utilities Commission Proceedings, Volume 5,
September 16, 1994, p. 1795.
3In 1991, according to the Energy Information Administration, IOUs provided power to roughly
76% of the 112 million consumers in the United States.
4 California Public Utilities Commission, Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's
Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring California's Electric Service Industry and Reforming
Regulation (OIR), R.94-04-031 and companion investigation, 1.94-04-032, April 20, 1994, p. 6.
5Charles R. Moyer, "The impending restructuring of the electric utility industry: causes and
consequences; Applied Economics; Industry Overview," Business Economics, Vol. 28, No. 4
(October 1993), p. 40.
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According to James Solberg, on behalf of SPURR, School Project for
Utility Rate Reduction & Regional Energy Management Coalition: "...if
electric rates were at the national average, schools in California would save in
excess of $130 million a year.... That amount of money would provide twenty
elementary schools, including land. $130 million would pay the salaries for
4400 teachers. Clearly, we have a lot at stake."6 In addition, it is doubtful that
"the level of assistance provided to low income ratepayers by a variety of state
and federal programs adequately compensates for inflated rates that California
utilities charge their residential ratepayers. In other words, low income
ratepayers are not made whole by these assistance programs; the assistance
programs are helpful, but in the end the ratepayers still pay too much." 7
In addition to lowering rates, the proposal to restructure the electric
services industry would also greatly increase the productivity of that
particular sector, and higher productivity stimulates greater economic growth
and creates more jobs. Competitive electricity markets would also eliminate
regional differences that work to the disadvantage of California's
manufacturing plants. Electricity is one of only a few plant inputs that varies
by location, while material and labor costs are fairly constant in comparison.
The inflated premium has thus handicapped the state's larger, industrial
ratepayers in their efforts to be competitive with firms in other states and
countries.
For example, Hughes is the biggest private employer in California,
with approximately 34,000 employees in the state and 52,000 worldwide.
Hughes is also Southern California Edison's largest private consumer.
Although electric energy costs represent a relatively small amount of total
costs, Hughes would like to be the lowest-cost producer of their products, and
"a savings of 30 percent or more on our electric costs, which is what we saved
with the deregulation of natural gas, represents a significant improvement to
our bottom line and a boost to our ability to compete."8
6 Reporter's Transcript, September 16, 1994, p. 1863.
7 Second Round Opening Comments of the Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON),
June 23, 1994, p. 20.
8 Reporter's Transcript, September 16, 1994, p. 1861.
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Robinsons-May Department Stores owns and operates 52 large
department stores in California, Arizona, and Nevada, and they employ
approximately 20,000 people. (The majority of the stores are in CA.) Says
representative Ken Wilkerson: "...our energy costs average 10.2 cents per
kilowatt-hour in California but only 6.7 cents in Nevada and 7.8 cents in
Arizona." Lower cost electricity would be an incentive to "utilize better
technology in the production process which will result in lower costs to the
end user and also accelerate the development of new technologies that will
create new jobs and industries for California."9
According to the CPUC, the "ills" plaguing California's electric
service industry include not only high rates, but: "a regulatory structure that
1) is out of step and often in conflict with a changing, more competitive
industry; 2) offers the utility at best weak incentives to operate and invest
efficiently; 3) is composed of numerous, costly, and administratively
burdensome proceedings; and 4) creates unnecessary barriers to, and therefore
threatens the quality of, public participation." 10 When services are
unbundled and priced separately, customers can make the most efficient
choices about operating procedures and they can select the most logical and
reasonable combination of techniques and services that meet their individual
circumstances and requirements.
1.2 Benefits of market reliance
Electricity is to "electric services" as food is to "dining services". In
the last 15 years, numerous legislative enactments and regulatory decisions
have transformed California's electric utilities from mere providers of a
commodity called electricity to providers of environmentally-sensitive
energy service. Electric services are a highly differentiated group of related
services "whose complexity and vast potential variation are mostly obscured
by the way utilities and current rate regulation 'bundle' and price electric
11
9Ibid., p. 1870-1871.
100IR, p. 7.
service"11 Regulatory reform will allow competitors to find not only new and
more efficient ways to provide these services, but to devise new and diverse
arrays of services designed specifically for individual consumer markets.
Currently, the electric utilities bear the sole responsibility for
developing and purchasing power supplies for sale to their ultimate end-
users, and the full benefits of competition will ultimately accrue to customers
only if they have the ability to choose among competitive suppliers in the
same way that they can today choose among providers of long-distance
telephone service or of natural gas. Markets will operate more efficiently
when customers can deal directly with suppliers to fashion a transaction that
best meets specific requirements at the least cost.
Under the existing system, the customer can make poor purchase
decisions in the wholesale market and the resulting wholesale costs can be
layered with inefficiencies. Unless the customer has the choice to leave its
utility and take its business elsewhere, the utility has little incentive to ensure
that its cost of acquiring generation services and the rates it charges for such
services are competitive and reasonable. The utility is at liberty to pass along
all of its costs to its customers, and Commission reasonableness reviews are
simply no substitute for the motivation provided by a truly competitive
market situation to solve the high cost problem. The process of
reasonableness reviews is also extremely complex, burdensome, and
expensive.
Any externalities in transactions-costs and benefits of production
or consumption activities that are not borne by producers or consumers-are
not significant enough to justify intervention into free enterprise. People are
by nature heterogeneous; businesses produce differing services, have different
technologies, and face different markets. Households vary not only in
wealth, but also in tastes. Some consumers may prefer short-lived and
inexpensive investments to purchases of energy efficient appliances, or
incandescent to fluorescent light. When individual customers can contract
separately, each bears the degree of risk it is willing to tolerate based on its
levels and forms of power use. The closer correlation between risk and
benefit results in efficient employment of resources and lower overall costs.
11California Energy Commission, Regulatory Reform and Electricity Industry Restructuring,
June 1994, p. I-6.
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Competition in free markets can also assure the most efficient use
of energy resources, in particular. Maximizing competition in retail and
wholesale energy markets will help all consumers to efficiently use resources
consistent with environmental protection. "Central planning" is not as
efficient nor as productive as market forces for cost-effectively achieving the
goals of environmental protection and other social policy objectives.
[Proposals to use market mechanism to more cost-effectively deliver social
services are being considered in several major sectors, e.g., health care,
insurance, schools, and penal institutions.]
13
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2 Industry Structure
The industry structure must be compatible with the physical and
technical requirements of the electric power system, while optimizing
economic investments and operation costs. The key elements of the electric
power market are: generation resources, the transmission/distribution
network which connects the customer loads with the generation resources,
and the dispatch/control centers which operate the system. The existing
organization is such that there is overlap in some of these provisions, and
costs are subsequently bundled. Separation of charges for distribution,
transmission, generation, and system control/dispatch functions will serve as
a fundamental step toward more accurate pricing to allow a more accurate
appraisal of the extent to which each utility's generation assets are above or
below market value. It will also minimize the opportunity for utilities to
unilaterally shift part of the cost of uneconomic generation assets to the
charges for other services.
A restructuring of the electric industry requires the development of
new institutional arrangements to support efficient markets which can be
taken advantage of by all customers, large and small. These include
arrangements for alternate generation resources (separate from other
elements of service), the provision of and payment for control area services,
efficient energy trading agreements, and efficient transmission access and
pricing. The CPUC proposes a two-track strategy, in which: 1) for "those
segments of the electric service business which exhibit natural monopoly
attributes, or where market power persists," performance-based regulation
would replace traditional cost-of-service regulation, and 2) "in those segments
for which competition offers a superior means of organizing the
development, delivery and consumption of services," the discipline of
market forces would substitute for traditional cost-of-service regulation. 12 In
the electricity industry, however, it is difficult to draw a distinct line between
those areas that are more efficiently served by a single natural monopoly (or
an oligopoly) and those areas which are conducive to workable competition.
15
120R, p. 28.
2.1 Power system management
An electric power system converts stored energy (chemical, nuclear,
hydro, etc.) into electric energy, transports this energy to a location, and finally
converts it again into the form in which it is ultimately needed. For example,
electric energy generated by a coal-burning electric power plant is carried
miles away through the transmission and distribution systems of one or
more electric utilities via 60 Hz electrical currents and voltages to eventually
become thermal energy in an electric stove. Electric service customers pay for
energy usage (e.g. kilowatt-hours) and not the rate at which it is used (i.e. the
power). After the development of the practical transformer, alternating
current eliminated the limitations imposed by the low voltage of direct
current, and it freed generation from the necessity of being 110 volts
transmission distance away from the load. Power stations could be built away
from congested load areas, in locations that were closer to fuel sources and
water.
The modern power system-which, in most cases, is a
consolidation of originally separate operating companies-demands
availability of power on demand, high service reliability, and reasonable cost.
How will the utility grid and grid operator function in a direct access world?
Furthermore, direct access customers will require a wide range of utility
services, in addition to the retail wheeling services which are today included
in bundled rates. These include: spinning reserve, reactive power,
scheduling, frequency control and load dispatching, load following, and
various other stand-by and back-up power services. These services are
complex and will be difficult to identify, measure, and price. Some of them
are transmission-related and fall under federal jurisdiction. Suppliers of
incoming power must be able to support these additional services in order to
maintain the continued reliability of the system as an increasing percentage of
the power supplied into the control area comes from other sources.
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2.1.1 The modem power system
A small utility may have only five or fewer generating stations. A
large one may have a hundred or more. Each plant may produce from a
hundred to many millions of kilowatts, or more. Some utilities may have no
generation facilities at all, while others lack sufficient generation to supply all
of their customers. They must therefore purchase their requirements from
other utilities. Power from the largest and most distant generating stations is
usually "transmitted" to the load area over the highest voltage circuits.
Interconnections from neighboring utilities, for exchange of economy or
emergency power, are made over "transmission" lines.
Circuit breakers are high-voltage switches which are usually
automatically operated to disconnect only the selected circuit to preserve
system service. There is usually an alternate circuit for power flow to
preserve system operation. In switching stations, circuit breakers sectionalize
the system by disconnecting the faulty equipment from the system in order to
protect it from further damage whenever a short-circuit occurs on a
transmission line (or some other equipment like a transformer or a bus).
High-voltage transmission lines are usually terminated in substations some
distance from the load because they are often not allowed in a populated area
and loads are frequently dispersed. At these substations, the voltage is
stepped down for the next journey through the subtransmission system.
Modern distribution substations are of small capacity and supply
power to a limited area through a few feeders. Primary distribution takes the
power from these substations to the final stepdown operations, which, in
residential areas, may be a distribution transformer. Power finally reaches a
large proportion of the customers, excluding the industrials and other large-
use consumers, through the secondary distribution system. Small industrial
customers are served directly by the primary feeders, while large customers
receive their power from the subtransmission system. Very large industrials
may be served from the transmission system itself.
The bulk power supply system-sometimes designated as the
"wholesale" part of the business-includes generation, transmission, primary
substations, and sometimes also subtransmission and distribution
substations. It contains the large steam-turbine generators, the high-voltage
17
transformers, the water wheel generators, and the power circuit breakers. The
system's operation, routine maintenance, and construction of new facilities
are all under centralized control. Distribution to residential and commercial
customers and some of the smaller industrials is considered the "retail" part
of the system. 13
There are losses associated with all physical processes involving
energy transfer and the conversion of energy into various forms. Many of the
loss mechanisms are inherent in the process and cannot simply be eliminated
by improved design or operation. Electrical efficiency is a physical ratio of the
conversion of electricity to useful work (e.g. the ratio of energy output to
energy input), where as efficiency in the use of electricity is an economic
measure. Electricity efficiency comes at a cost which is determined by the
market prices of the resources needed to produce the electricity, and increased
electricity efficiency is only worthwhile if it is the most valuable use of these
resources.
2.1.2 Control area services
The system load is the sum of all the loads drawn by all of the
operating devices, in addition to the system losses. The instantaneous load is
determined primarily by the customers. When any energy-consuming device
is selected on or off, the system frequency and voltage are affected. The effects
of small, household appliances are relatively infinitesimal and are masked by
the simultaneous starting and stopping of other devices throughout the
entire system. Large rolling mills, on the other hand, can cause large, sudden,
and frequent variations in load; in some cases, they can lead to undesirable
changes in tie-line load between systems. Sometimes industrial customers
such as these can present utilities with major problems of load, voltage, and
frequency control; but on most systems, significant changes in load only occur
with changes in the pace of activity-at the beginning and end of the
morning and afternoon shifts in the factories, and with sunrise, sunset, and
bedtime.
13
"Wholesale" and "retail" markets will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
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Nevertheless, power must be available to the consumer in any
amount required from minute to minute. The demands for reliability of
service increase daily as the industrial and social environment becomes more
complex. Control area services are the functions that must be performed
continuously and automatically by a control area operator in order to
preserve system reliability and stability, balance generation with load, and
maintain system frequency and voltage. If customer demand increases, or if a
generator fails, the system must respond immediately to compensate for the
shortfall and rebalance the amount of generation with the amount of load.
To ensure that the amount of power flowing between areas matches the net
of all schedules, the operator maintains "spinning" and operating reserves,
controls the generation and transmission dispatch within its area, coordinates
with the neighboring control areas, and uses an Automatic Generation
Control computer system that controls generators automatically to keep the
system constantly in balance. In addition, calculating techniques take into
account system expansion from the existing pattern, outages for whatever
reason, interconnections with other utilities, and load characteristics to
provide optimum economic design solutions.
California belongs to the Western System Coordinating Council
(WSCC), which is a single synchronized electrical system with 36 control areas
encompassing all of the western states plus two Canadian provinces and Baja
California. Eight of the 36 control areas in the WSCC belong to California
alone. The existence of multiple control areas within the same synchronous
system creates numerous potential reliability (e.g., loop flows and scheduling
errors) and free rider problems. [It is difficult to unbundle, measure, and
allocate the costs of control area services to individual parties and
transactions for one control area, but because these services are largely
provided by automatic equipment, customers will continue to receive them
whether or not they have contracted and fully paid for them.] To minimize
these problems, utilities depend on many bilateral and multilateral
interconnection and coordination agreements and on voluntary WSCC
reliability criteria. These arrangements rely heavily on cooperation among
interconnected utilities to refrain from exploiting system imperfections.
19
2.2 Generation vs. transmission
According to the large industrial companies that make up the
Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON): "Generation is no longer a
natural monopoly. Generation markets are increasingly becoming more
competitive and subject to market discipline. Thus, in the short run,
regulated utilities should be required to competitively procure all their
resources. If one type of resource is procured in competitive markets, other
resources offered as substitutes should be selected in the same manner. The
planning and operation of the electric utility industry can be made more
efficient by increasing the role of competition as a disciplining factor, not by
continuing or expanding the central planning model of traditional
regulation." 14
San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) adds: "A major justification for
treating electricity supply as a monopoly has been the impossibility of
coordinating the actions of competitors by using prices to match supply to
demand instantaneously at each of hundreds of locations, as required on an
interconnected grid. Recent advances in information technology make it
practical now to use competitive markets much more extensively in
managing an electricity system, but only by carefully integrating market
processes into the still-essential central control and coordination functions."15
On the other hand, "Because the transmission/distribution and
control/dispatch functions are monopoly services, they must continue to be
regulated in order to ensure that their rates are cost-based and that the
services they provide are available on a nondiscriminatory basis."1 6 Some
have also posited that transmission is a common carrier and therefore should
be regulated.
14 ELCON, 2nd round opening, p. 11.
15Third Round Opening Comments of San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) on
Competitive Wholesale Electric Markets and Market Institutions in the Restructured Electric
Industry, July 31, 1994.
16Third Round Opening Comments of the Federal Executive Agencies (FEA), July 26,1994, p. 7.
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The CPUC proposal defers any significant industrial restructuring,
including some divestiture of utility assets, implying that while greater
generation competition seems both desirable as well as feasible, preserving
the utilities as integrated firms may still be economically efficient.
Nevertheless, some interested parties maintain the necessity for a clear
distinction of generation from transmission and distribution. The California
Large Energy Consumers Association (CLECA) insists: "...ownership of
transmission facilities, which are generally agreed to be monopoly facilities,
should be separated from ownership of generation resources in order to
reduce incentives for the joint owner of transmission and generation
facilities to use its monopoly power to discriminate against other
generators." 17 In their third round comments, the Federal Executive
Agencies (FEA) concur: "Currently, the largest market for each utility's
generation is its own transmission and distribution system; and each
transmission and distribution system's largest supplier is its own generation
division. It is no wonder that there has been a lack of competitive cost-
cutting behavior by the utility companies who also operate in an expensive
regulatory environment." 18
CLECA believes that in order to achieve "an electric power market
that is truly fair and competitive," operational and financial divestiture of the
current generation, transmission, and distribution systems and a "greater
horizontal integration of the transmission system" are essential. CLECA
foresees a competitive generation market with "no party having undue
market power, a fully integrated and regulated transmission system (initially
state-wide but ultimately regional), and desegregated, regulated distribution
systems that are closer to the end-use customer." 19
Southern California Gas Company also supports in unbundling
transmission and generation costs at the wholesale level to deny companies
that provide vertically integrated electric services the potential to exclude or
17 Third Round Opening Comments of the California Large Energy Consumers Association
(CLECA), July 26, 1994, p. 6.
18FEA, 3rd round opening, p. 11.
19CLECA, 3rd round opening, p. 5.
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to discriminate against third-party transmission users. "Also, after
unbundling, a vertically integrated utility will lack the ability to subsidize its
higher priced generation by charging itself lower transmission rates. Making
transmission rates transparent to all users and unbundling control area
services make generation costs more visible, thereby promoting healthy
competition."2 0 Furthermore, for transmission and distribution, "it will be
impractical for multiple suppliers to provide these services."21 Thus,
contends the FEA, the Commission should retain its full regulatory
jurisdiction over the noncompetitive services. According to the CLECA,
"RTG's [Regional Transmission Groups] have been envisioned as a means of
achieving coordination of transmission service and investment in
transmission system additions. They are also expected to coordinate
transmission pricing within a region."22
Despite such commonly-held views that generation is clearly
competitive, while transmission and distribution are sure natural
monopolies, this boundary is actually not clear. To varying degrees,
transmission, distribution, and generation are interchangeable. New
generation capacity in one area can be covered or be avoided by transmission
upgrades in another area of the interconnected grid. Within the same area,
solar photovoltaic and other emerging distributed technologies can
increasingly displace the need for new distribution lines and capacity
upgrades, and competition then occurs in connection with voltage support
and energy. In addition, grid operators must have some control over
generation in order to follow loads, maintain voltage and frequency, and
provide reactive power.23
It may well be that the many decisions needed to coordinate the
complex substitutions and integrations between generation, transmission,
and distribution are more efficiently made within a firm rather than through
20Third Round Opening Comments of the Southern California Gas Company, July 26,1994,
p. 16.
2 1FEA, 3rd round opening, p. 15.
2 2 CLECA, 3rd round opening, p. 7.
23The California Energy Commission, p. 1-24.
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market exchanges between multiple connecting firms. States the California
Energy Commission: "At best, there is evidence to prove that bulk power
generation can be supplied through a competitive market, but there is less
evidence to prove that this is true for dispatchable peaking and intermediate
load-following generation, let alone the more precise generation system
control required by today's modern electricity systems."2 4 The complex
interrelationships between transmission, distribution, and generation reflect
basic principles of both economics and engineering, and optimal industrial
structure will likely change over time in response to changes in economic
factors (prices) as well as technology. Because of the difficulties inherent in
predicting the optimal delineation between competitive and monopolistic
components of the electricity business, regulators should allow the most
economically efficient industrial structure to evolve from market forces.
23
24Ibid., p. I-17.
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3 Ratemaking reform
Rates in California are currently set by a complicated system of
balancing accounts and retrospective "reasonableness" reviews. Each of these
mechanisms was developed to address very real problems encountered by the
electric utilities in the past. However, the conditions that necessitated them
are now largely dissipated or have been accommodated by the utilities. The
OIR therefore proposes to replace existing cost-of-service regulation with
performance-based regulation as the means by which reasonable rates are
ensured. Traditional cost-of-service regulation has resulted in unintended
consequences, including distorted price signals to customers and inaccurate
investment incentives for utilities.
An allocation of risks and benefits consistent with utility
performance relative to the market would provide new, potentially
beneficial, incentives and could serve as an excellent substitute for the
existing regulatory structure. As a result, many of the interested parties
participating the restructuring debate favor performance-based ratemaking,
arguing that this pricing scheme severs the link between increased earnings
and ratebase additions. It can balance risk between shareholders and
ratepayers far better than balancing accounts and with far less regulatory
burden than reasonableness reviews. Performance-based ratemaking also
lends itself to integration with other efforts to reduce uneconomic costs.
3.1 Cost-of-service regulation
The driving force behind cost-of-service regulation is ensuring a fair
return on undepreciated capital. Supporters of cost-of-service regulation
maintain that it offers balance and stability and assures that customers pay no
more than the utility's costs. Cost-of-service pricing is also an important
component in reconciling resource planning with a competitive electric
services industry. In order to make informed decisions regarding purchases
and investments, participants and non-participants of utility demand-side
management programs (DSM) need to know the true cost of each utility DSM
offering. According to ELCON, "DSM products and services provided by
25
regulated utilities should be priced based on the cost of service and the utility
should be allowed the opportunity to earn a fair rate-of-return on only actual
costs prudently incurred and in rate base. Participants should pay the full cost
incurred to provide the service."25
However, the tie to DSM may become a moot argument for
continuing cost of service regulation as utility-funded energy efficiency
programs like DSM face possibility of elimination under the new market-
oriented regime.2 6 In any case, cost-of-service regulation engenders criticism
of its own. Detractors maintain that this system does not give utilities
sufficiently strong incentives to provide high-quality service at the lowest
reasonable price over time. The current cost-of-service ratemaking is also
costly and burdensome. It has resulted in the creation of inappropriate
incentives which have encouraged investment in ratebase whether or not
such investment has been efficient. Cost-of-service regulation has forced
utilities to ignore customer needs and demands in service structures and
instead offer a limited range of inflexible cost-based services.
CLECA asserts that the current utility regulatory process is broken.
"There is no zero-based budgeting and there is no assessment of the utility's
costs against an independent benchmark. A fundamental weakness of the
system is that the utility's own costs are the point of reference in determining
what these costs should be in the future."27 The California Energy
Commission believes the CPUC should relax its traditional cost-of-service
regulation for not only utility service customers, but for direct access
customers as well. In addition to enhancing consumer choice, this
modification could encourage all electricity consumers to seek out, and allow
competing service providers to offer, a larger array of services using
distributed energy, telecommunications, and end-use energy efficiency
technologies.
25 ELCON, 2nd round opening, p. 14.
2 6 See chapter 5.
27First Round Reply Comments of the California Large Energy Consumers Association (CLECA),
June 21, 1994.
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3.2 Performance-based ratemaking
Performance-based ratemaking (PBR) proposals adjust utility
returns from present levels established by cost-of-service ratemaking based on
the ability of the utility to reduce its costs relative to various established
productivity targets or other objective benchmarks. This would eliminate the
relationship between increased earnings and ratebase additions. For example,
new generation plants constructed by a utility would produce income based
entirely upon the plant's output, as opposed to the traditional method of
tying earnings to a percentage of investment in the plant. This form of
ratemaking provides a direct incentive for efficient investment and gives the
utility a reason to emphasize cost-effective demand-side management and
environmental programs, as well has customer-preferred service structures.
Performance-based ratemaking can thus balance risk between
shareholders and ratepayers far better than balancing accounts and with far
less regulatory burden than traditional reasonableness reviews. According to
Southern California Edison Company (Edison), "PBR provides powerful
incentives to increase the efficiencies with which existing assets are utilized.
Adoption of PBR will provide a transitional bridge to a more competitive,
long-run industry structure."2 8 Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) also favors
performance-based ratemaking over cost-of-service regulation and intends to
competitively sell unbundled electric power to direct access customers in a
way that protects full service customers from responsibility for any lost
contribution to margin, whether due to reduced prices or lost sales.
In August 1994, the CPUC approved SDG&E's five-year experiment
with a base-rate incentive plan, which rewards shareholders for holding
down rates, but also penalize them if rates and earnings do not meet targets.
SDG&E, who was the first utility in California to propose PBR, is already
operating under incentive plans for gas procurement and
generation/dispatch. 2 9 "Under the base rate plan, SDG&E shareholders will
retain all earnings up to 1% above the authorized rate of return, which now
stands at 9.03%, but which the utility has asked to increase to 9.95%. Earnings
28 Edison, 8/24/94, p. 24.
29PG&E and Edison have PBR plans pending at the Commission, but neither of those have yet
been approved.
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between 1% and 1.5% above ROR will be allocated 75% to shareholders and
25% to ratepayers, and earnings between 1.5% and 3% above ROR will be split
equally between the two groups...On the downside, shareholders will absorb
any shortfall below ROR. And if earnings exceed 3% above ROR, the
commission may open up the PBR for investigation, under the assumption
that the mechanism needs correcting." To prevent SDG&E from raising
earnings and cutting rates at the expense of quality, the plan also measures
reliability, safety and customer satisfaction.3 0
Still, CLECA believes implementation of PBR is not enough.
"There is considerable evidence that regulation, even incentive regulation,
will never apply the downward pressure on rates that competition can and
does apply. When industrial customers, like the members of CLECA, secure
supplies of the inputs to their production processes, they negotiate with
multiple suppliers for the best price and terms. If they are unhappy with a
given supplier, they can go elsewhere."31 Methods to phase competition into
the electric services industry will be discussed in the next chapter.
30
"California PUC okays SDG&E incentive plan; EEI rate index one of several measures,"
Electric Utility Week, August 8, 1994, p. 1.
3 1CLECA, 1st round reply.
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4 Competition
In the electric utility industry, the terms "wholesale" and "retail"
have traditionally applied to two easily distinguishable kinds of transactions.
Under the OIR, customers of California utilities who rely solely upon their
franchised utilities for electric service are making "retail purchases", while
electric utilities acquire a portion of the electricity needed to serve this load by
purchasing power from other suppliers in "wholesale transactions." "Direct
access customers" are those who choose to manage their own electricity
supply in the competitive generation market. The power they purchase at
retail may have been supplied by the same source by which a utility secured
power in a wholesale transaction.
Options for introducing competition to the electric services industry
vary in scope and manner of implementation. Some advocate only
wholesale reform, in which utilities would most likely transact business
through a mandatory pool and retail consumers would continue to purchase
from their present utility providers. Others support a direct access
environment where retail customers are able to choose power from
whichever entity they prefer, either through a pool scenario-with the option
of entering into financial contracts for differences outside the pool-or
through multilateral contracts and market mechanisms only.
4.1 Scope
Opinions differ on whether competition should be first introduced
at the wholesale level and then gradually phased into retail sales, or should
direct access be implemented immediately for all customers. A wholesale
market for electric services currently exists and continues to develop. With
respect to institutional arrangements, California's utilities have long relied
on external power purchases to provide retail service. A predominantly
voluntary development of interconnected transmission networks has
enhanced beneficial wholesale energy transactions and facilitated the creation
of sophisticated contractual agreements and financial mechanisms. Direct
access would be extended to customers through "retail wheeling". Wheeling
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usually involves changes in energy flows over a transmission system, and
retail wheeling would ideally occur between a private generator and a private
user. In this way, the consumer would be able to buy electric power from
whom he or she chooses.
Advocates of direct access on the retail level believe it is inherently
inefficient for a utility to procure resources for a large and diverse set of
customers and argue that different customers desire different levels of service
reliability and different types of financial arrangements. They claim that an
adequate level of product differentiation cannot be provided efficiently by a
single utility, so resource development needs to be decentralized and made
more customer-driven. With retail direct access, customers would have the
opportunity to be their own portfolio managers, and direct access supporters
believe this will result in greater economic efficiency and freedom of choice.
Opponents, on the other hand, contend that end-use efficiency will be
harmed by direct access and decentralized development. They maintain that
the utility performs a valuable role as a portfolio manager and that the total
costs of electricity-related services will not be minimized on a system-wide
basis if resource development is purely customer-driven. Skeptics envision
distribution utilities continuing to act as portfolio managers on behalf of
ultimate consumers and shopping for required generation in a wholesale
market.
4.1.1 Wholesale markets
Current markets can be most easily expanded and their
competitiveness increased by focusing first on wholesale transactions, since
the existing market has primarily developed on that basis. Competition
among suppliers at the wholesale level can benefit all electricity consumers by
driving down electricity prices and introducing additional choices and
options. If some consumers eligible for direct access elect to continue relying
on the utility to procure their power, these customers will still benefit from
wholesale competition because of the indirect reduced costs.
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In the OIR, the Commission observed that high transaction costs,
limited access to information, and barriers to access and efficient use of the
transmission infrastructure hinder the competitiveness of the existing
wholesale market. SDG&E adds: "...it [the wholesale market] has not
achieved equality among competing suppliers, and, as presently structured, it
cannot maximize efficiencies."32 Wholesale competition therefore depends
largely on transmission access, which must be available to all potential
suppliers on a nondiscriminatory basis and under reasonable terms and
conditions at cost-based rates. In order to maximize the number of potential
transactions, all potential suppliers must have reasonable access to all
potential purchasers.
The greatest degree of competition would occur if there were a
separation of ownership for generation assets, transmission and distribution
assets, and the assets used to dispatch and control the electric system. "When
the owner of the transmission/distribution system (to which the customers
are attached) also owns a substantial amount of generation, there may be a
natural tendency to want to maximize the use of that owned or controlled
generation by employing it to supply service to its customers. This may
manifest itself in a number of actions such as resistance to shopping the
market for more economical power supplies, high prices and restrictive terms
and conditions for transmission service, and restricted access to and/or
overpricing of system control, dispatch and other ancillary services," warns
the FEA.3 3
Commissioner Conlon advocates accounting rules that would
separate transmission and generation assets, so that utilities could not use
transmission rates to subsidize their generation-which would be under
increasing competitive pressure. Accounting rules are not enough for
Californians for Competitive Electricity (CaCE)34, which urges utilities to
divest their generation assets and states: "Ideally, the most effective method
of achieving open and fair competition would be to remove the regulated
32 SDG&E, 3rd round opening.
33FEA, 3rd round opening, p. 11.
34 A group which includes non-utility generators and the influential, 800-member California
Manufacturers Association.
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utilities entirely from the generation market, leaving them to operate as
transmission and distribution service providers." According to CaCE, this
would require utilities to sell or spin off existing generation assets so they are
economically indifferent to the power that they transmit to customers, and
could not favor their own resources.35
SDG&E believes that with a competitive wholesale market in place,
retail wheeling is not essential for market access by consumers. It maintains
that "effective customer choice does not depend on retail wheeling from
individual generators any more than consumer choice for vegetables requires
buyers to be able to shop directly with farmers ....Retail wheeling without
wholesale market reforms simply preserves the inefficiencies of the existing
system in order for a select few to make power sales to the customers with the
best load patterns, creating inequities among customers that may increase the
costs to customers that are not able to take advantage of 'retail wheeling'."3 6
To illustrate their point, SDG&E offers an example. In order to help
keep its rates low, the utility currently purchases substantial amounts of
power in the market, buying as much as the market and system reliability will
allow. Under the common definition of "retail wheeling", SDG&E expects
that those currently selling to SDG&E at wholesale at a low price will seek to
sell directly to those SDG&E customers with the best load profile, at a higher
price. If such a sale occurs, SDG&E's remaining customers would no longer
receive the benefits of the low-cost power, and their rates would increase.
"This same result will occur even if all customers are given the opportunity
to take advantage of 'retail wheeling' because only the customers with the best
load characteristics will be attractive enough to be able to take advantage of
this opportunity." 3 7 Therefore, contends SDG&E, instead of providing
benefits to all customers, retail wheeling would provide benefits to a few, at
the expense of others. Under this system, the only customers with a true
"choice" are the ones with the most attractive load characteristics. Edison
agrees the direct access customer would be unprepared to deal with (in real
3 5 Ray Pospisil, "The California Aftershock," Electrical World, Vol. 208, No. 9 (September
1994), p. 29.
36 SDG&E, 3rd round opening.
3 7 1bid.
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time) complex arrangements for scheduling of power and energy, regulation
of generation to follow loads, as well as with those contracts for adjusting
operations in response to operating contingencies. Consequently, these
individuals would pose a significant threat to reliable operations.
4.1.2 Retail wheeling
What benefits can be derived from retail competition that are not
available from a highly-competitive wholesale power market? Some argue
that wholesale-only competition limits the size and scope of the market and
consequently restricts opportunities for innovation and market entry. In
addition, the Coalition for Choice in Electricity (CCE) maintains direct access
has environmental benefits. "If green resources truly are cost-effective they
will be adopted more quickly under direct access, where people can deal
directly with green suppliers....With direct access, packagers of green resources
will be further able to differentiate their products."3 8
It may also take many years for efficiency gains associated with
improvements in the wholesale markets to benefit end-users, since wholesale
transactions, where the utility acts as an agent for all end-users, impose a
single purchasing strategy and risk management approach on all customers.
One of the alleged advantages of retail competition is that customers can
create their own portfolios of power and make their own decisions about
their needs. The FEA points: "A competitive wholesale market alone means
that choice exists only when a monopoly utility purchases power from
another utility, QF, IPP, etc. for resale; not when an end-use customer
purchases power..." 39 CLECA further notes: "Serving an industrial customer
is no different from serving a municipal utility at a node in the transmission
system. There is no inherent reason to distinguish these types of customers
by delaying introduction of retail direct access."40
3 8 Second Round Opening Comments of the Coalition for Choice in Electricity (CCE),
April 20, 1994, p. 21.
3 9FEA, 3rd round opening, p. 6.
40CLECA, 3rd round opening.
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CCE is also confident that the retail direct access customer will be
able to best arrange its own power supplies to meet its individual objectives.
"They might place different values on reliability, on-peak service, or
flexibility of their takes. Insisting that a single portfolio of resources must
serve all customers regardless of their individual objectives forecloses the
choices of those who value different types of power supplies. Such insistence
makes no more sense than does requiring all investors to hold the same mix
of stocks and bonds. In an uncertain world, there is no choice but to bear
some risks. Direct access customers will not only have access to their own
power supplies. They will also have access to baskets of risk of their own
choosing, rather than of the utility's choosing."41 A direct access program
creates the value of competitive pressure, which allows customers to choose
their own preferred portfolios of power, with whatever combination of price
and service risk they prefer.
4.2 Implementation
Significant savings can frequently be achieved by extending and
consolidating economic dispatch over large areas because multiple utilities
can take advantage of load and resource diversity to equalize short-run
marginal generating cost between control areas. Utilities in some regions
have formed power pools, in which the aggregate generating capacity of a
pool's members is centrally dispatched by a privately owned company
independent of the utilities and other generation suppliers as if the members
were a single utility. There is disagreement, however, about whether or not
such regional power pools are necessary in order for efficient, competitive,
"direct access" electric industry. According to some, without a regional power
pool, direct access would simply reallocate power already being generated
from one buyer to another. Others maintain that pools would create serious
implementation problems, while the existing arrangement of bilateral and
multilateral contracts better provide for a wide array of products and service
offerings.
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4 1CCE, 2nd round opening, p. 23.
4.2.1 Power pools
It is the pool's job to dispatch the electric power system optimally,
determine how existing transmission is to be used, balance loads and
resources on a real-time basis, and ensure the safe and reliable operation of
the grid. By definition, a pool ensures that operation and dispatch of the
system is completely unbiased and based solely on what is the optimal
dispatch, determined from prices that suppliers bid. This is achieved because
the pool is completely independent of any buyer or seller of power or
transmission.
Edison has proposed a model for a regional "POOLCO" which
would be operated by an independent entity who would be paid fees assessed
against all market participants in return for operating the regional system
reliably and for purchasing and allocating the costs of control area services-
e.g. dispatch, spinning reserve, and frequency and voltage control-in an
equitable manner to market participants. POOLCO would operate on a
regional basis co-extensive with the relevant generation market, and it would
ensure efficient dispatch of generation by balancing loads and resources in
real-time. Membership would be open to all power sellers and transmitters
on a non-discriminatory basis. Regional transmission groups (RTGs) would
establish transmission access and pricing rules, and the "Independent Power
System Operator" (IPSO) would make all transmission access decisions based
on a prefiled open-access tariff.42
According to SDG&E, "the objective of a pool-based wholesale
market is to reduce the costs of electricity by increasing competition in those
parts of the electricity system where market forces can be effective and
efficient, while legislative and regulatory attention focuses on the remaining
monopoly parts of the industry and on the environmental and social goals
that competitive markets cannot be expected to handle."4 3 In the wholesale
42The extent of this operator's role and responsibilities is under debate. PG&E wants the
integrated utility to continue performing transmission and system operation functions.
SDG&E believes continued involvement invites disputes and continued regulatory
involvement in what should be a competitive market. (See Fourth Round Reply Comments of
SDG&E, September 30, 1994, p. 11.)
4 3SDG&E, 3rd round opening.
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pool SDG&E recommends, sellers bid a price, location, and amount of power
to be delivered into the grid and retailers bid a price, quantity and location of
power they seek to purchase. The pool operator dispatches the system
optimally and establishes a market clearing price at different locations that
reflect the scarcity or abundance of transmission at those locations. Ideally,
this gives price signals that will stimulate interest in building new
transmission where there is scarcity, and encourage new generation where
transmission is abundant. Sellers that are dispatched receive this clearing
price; buyers pay the clearing price plus an additional payment to reflect other
costs of the grid, such as voltage support.4 4
A pool does not necessarily preclude bilateral contracting to allocate
risks and rewards. In fact, says SDG&E, it helps these transactions to occur by,
among other things, "(i) making market information available to the
participants, (ii) providing for transmission, and (iii) providing a structure in
which back-up energy is automatically available at the pool price, so buyers do
not need to bargain this out separately ....One convenience of the pool is that it
automatically sells all contracting parties back-up energy at the local pool price
whenever they need it, and purchases any excess power at the local pool price.
This system helps to encourage bilateral contracts that might otherwise not
occur because, for example, one of the parties is concerned about the need for
backup energy."4 5 Edison also insists there are valuable benefits unique to the
pool system.4 6 They are:
1) assurance that the region's electric system will be operated in a
least-cost manner.
2) assurance that contract disputes will not disrupt the continuity
of service or interfere with the system's economic dispatch.
44Ibid.
45Ibid.
46Third Round Opening Comments of Southern California Edison Company (Edison),
July 26, 1994, p. 6.
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3) elimination of market power resulting from lack of
information and high transaction costs and establishment of a
level playing field so that small users and residential
customers could enjoy the benefits of competition.
4) elimination of self-dealing concerns by placing control over
transmission service decisions into the hands of an
independent entity that is unaffiliated with any market
participant.
5) assurance of access to the market for all generators through
creation of an open access transmission network and a
mechanism for integrated planning and expansion of the
network.
6) mechanisms for assuring that costs associated with
appropriate state regulatory and legislative policies cannot be
bypassed.
7) potential resolution of reciprocity concerns by requiring all
market participants to play by the same rules.
In contrast, bilateral trading would necessitate further regulatory intervention
in the form of approving scheduling of retail transactions, transmitting
power along contract paths, and addressing control area services. SDG&E
purports: "A pool will involve less government intrusion than the current
bilateral system which involves multiple agreements, and under which every
contract is subject to regulatory oversight and the continually changing
regulatory environment."4 7
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4 7Ibid.
4.2.1.1 Economic Efficiency
Once an efficient wholesale pool has been established, consumers
can obtain market access through retail utility prices that unbundle the pool
price from the balance of utility costs. This will make it possible for
consumers to make their own contract arrangements for longer-term price
stability and portfolio diversity, with the utility's obligation to supply
redefined as the obligation to provide access to the wholesale market. SDG&E
is confident that retail access to the market and redefinition of utility
obligations can proceed as quickly as the pooling institutions and technical
facilities (e.g., metering) are put in place.
Edison insists a pool would provide a transparent market
mechanism so that both buyers and generation suppliers would receive
proper price signals. Since transmitting utilities would not be able to favor
their own generation, all generators can compete fairly in the regional
market. In addition, Edison claims a regional pool potentially solves the
problem of unfair competition by out-of-state and/or publicly subsidized
utilities since all parties that join the pool would be required to transfer
control over the use of their transmission facilities to the IPSO, which would
then make those facilities available on a non-discriminatory basis to all
market participants and allow all competitors equal competitive
opportunities. The pool would thus promote fair and open competition.
Transaction costs also would be avoided since sellers can simply bid
into the pool. Generation would be purchased through the pool on the basis
of bid prices in order to acquire rights to sufficient generation for control area
services, and the pool would then collect from all customers a share of the
costs of providing the services based on their individual usage. In this way,
the market will determine the appropriate price for control area services and
all users of the system will thus be required to bear their fair share of the costs.
This system avoids free-riders because all customers and generators would be
bound by the pool rules and obligated to pay for the control area services
needed to serve them. Profits would come from producing power at low cost
rather than by cornering market information or acquiring facility in
negotiating transmission and control area services arrangements. IPSO
would decide when new transmission is needed based upon economic and
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operational constraints and would dispatch all generation and transmission
resources brought to the pool on an economic basis. Because POOLCO would
be an independent company, Edison contends it should encourage new
transmission pricing principles that have economic efficiency and fair cost
recovery as their primary objectives and free utilities to market their
generation.
Furthermore, Edison believes "...POOLCO would provide an open
and highly visible market accessible to all sellers and buyers that sign the
POOLCO connection agreement (which specifies the pool rules), and would
provide hourly market clearing pool spot prices to all participants. It is
contemplated that the day-ahead 24 hourly pool spot prices could be
published in electronic form on a bulletin board, and in printed form in the
next day's newspaper."48 The pool spot price would include components for
both the bid price of energy and the hourly shortage value of power (the
equivalent of the value of capacity). It would be low when capacity is in
surplus, but rise as the need for new capacity increases. Customers would
have the option of either buying power directly from the pool at the spot
market price, or entering into individually-tailored financial contracts with
suppliers for a fixed term to hedge against market uncertainty or to provide
for any particular conditions of service. These contracts would not, however,
detract from the actual operation of the pool.
Similarly, SDG&E's wholesale pool would establish different prices
for generation delivered at locations affected by transmission congestion to
provide the market with the necessary price for determining signals if new
generation or new transmission is needed. "A short-term electricity spot
market is needed to assure long-run competition." The grid would then be
expanded when users that would benefit from that expansion through
reduced energy prices agreed to do so. Additionally, if no coalition of grid
users can be formed, regulatory procedures, similar to those in use now,
would decide whether additional transmission projects are appropriate.
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48 Edison, 3rd round opening, p. 15.
Because the pool is designed to provide the market clearing price to
all end-users, it spreads the benefits of low cost power equitably among all
consumers. "In contrast," states SDG&E, "various forms of bilateral trading,
which reduce to retail wheeling, preserve the inefficiencies of the existing
system and strive to take advantage of those inefficiencies to create inequities
among customer classes."49 Unlike with the bilateral trading model, power
pool customers do not need to make a commitment to market access in order
to enjoy the advantages of market-based prices, and they retain the option to
purchase at the pool's spot price or to take the average monthly price from
their local distribution company.
4.2.1.2 Operational Efficiency
The current bulk power markets in the western region of the U.S.
are characterized by numerous market and regulatory imperfections, and
control area operators will have much less control over system operation as
the market becomes more crowded and numerous direct access customers are
purchasing load following services or spinning reserves from outside
utilities, non-utility generators, or marketers. Edison itself has encountered
numerous problems in the past in applying the current bilateral contract
structure to the wholesale customers located within its control area.
"Capacity responsibility requirements have been difficult to obtain, monitor,
and enforce. Methods for identifying, measuring, accounting and
compensating for mis-scheduling have been very imprecise. Adequate
methods for allocating responsibility for curtailments attendant to loop flow
have not been developed. Uneconomic bypass, free-riding and extensive
litigation have accompanied these imperfect relationships." Unless there are
arrangements in place to deal with these issues, there will be tremendous
opportunities for free riding on, for example, the spinning reserves of others,
and this would inequitably shift costs to either the utility or other customers
buying control area services from that utility.50
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49 SDG&E, 3rd round opening.
5 0Edison, 3rd round opening, p. 12.
These problems arise especially in electricity markets because "the
running costs of generating units vary significantly, according to function and
type of unit, from low variable cost nuclear and coal units to higher cost
peaking units, and very low cost hydro units. Unless the market institutions
in place provide a working mechanism for low cost sellers to match up with
buyers in a particular hour or half-hour, units that are not the most efficient
will be run. Without the creation of a region-wide power pool having some
of the characteristics of the England-Wales pool, the efficiencies sought by the
Commission will have no realistic opportunity to arise."51 To support a
direct access market, the existing structure for providing control area services
needs to be replaced with a new arrangement that properly aligns financial
incentives with prudent operating guidelines.
According to Edison, there is no practical way to achieve a balance
in the production and consumption of electricity in a market in which a large
number of buyers are purchasing from a large number of remote sellers
except through a power pool. The bilateral and multilateral arrangements
between utilities were not designed to accommodate retail customers and did
not envision neighboring utilities competing aggressively with each other for
retail loads. They depend heavily on the cooperation of these utilities to
maintain reliable and safe operation. These relationships will break down as
competition to serve direct access customers intensifies.
Edison argues its POOLCO approach deals directly and
comprehensively with the difficult issues involving coordination and control
area services. The single IPSO would "avoid the complications inherent in
coordinating transactions among multiple control areas, the associated free-
rider problems, and the potential that a control area operator would favor the
dispatch of its own generation."5 2 In addition, because the system would be
operated on an integrated basis, there would no longer be a need for concerns
regarding loop flow and other transmission related property rights. The pool
would provide a guaranteed source of power in case a contracted-for supplier
failed to perform or the customer chose to exceed its contract supply. Edison
maintains that under the pool system, power would be consumed more
51First Round Opening Comments of Southern California Edison Company, June 8, 1994,
p. 27-28.
52Edison, 3rd round opening, p. 14.
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efficiently, and investment decisions would be made in response to market
forces instead of regulation.
CLECA adds: "The importance of a pooled arrangement for electric
power markets can be explained in terms of the nature of networked systems.
Due to the physics of electrical energy flows, decisions made about any one
component of the power system affect all other parts of the system. Thus one
cannot isolate individual transactions in a network system as one can in
other systems such as natural gas. This aspect tends to limit the usefulness of
bilateral contracting, in isolation, for electricity supplies. A power pool in
conjunction with hedging contracts (contracts for differences) provides the
best long term vehicle for a competitive market."53
In contrast, Enron Power Marketing, Inc. (ENRON) firmly believes
the Commission should not mandate the establishment of a centralized pool
and states that a robust and reliable cash market will develop in the absence of
a centrally dispatched pool, while efficiencies would be lost through such an
approach. It believes that one of the shortcomings of a centralized pool is its
inflexibility with respect to service terms relating to physical delivery.
Transactions are crammed into one-size-fits-all templates, and "even a matrix
of service options falls short of the diversity and ingenuity of products
designed in bilateral transactions in an open market."54 It cites the gas
delivery system as an example in comparison.
In response, SDG&E maintains that the gas analogy is not
appropriate. "In contrast to gas, the short term costs of power varies
substantially by location and time of day depending on what power plants are
operating and what the demand is at a given time. Different plants at
different locations can have dramatically different costs. Power is not
immediately interchangeable. One obvious result of this is that the cost of so-
called 'imbalances' are extremely time and location sensitive."55 According to
SDG&E, these differences explain the need for central market dispatch and
locational spot market pricing, where as the bilateral trading models do not
explain how they would address this issue.
5 3CLECA, 1st round opening, p. 6.
5 4 First Round Opening Comments of Enron Power Marketing, Inc. (Enron), June 8,1994, p. 18.
5 5 SDG&E, 4th round reply, p. 18.
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SDG&E also asserts that control requirements for electricity are
more complex than those for gas. "Operating conditions require close
monitoring and control over short time horizons, and operators must be able
to anticipate emergencies. Demand and supply balances change
instantaneously, and the system operator must be able to respond to these
changes promptly....Perhaps the most obvious difference between gas and
electricity is that electricity is delivered over an interconnected network in
which every power plant and every load affects the power flow, the
congestion on the transmission lines, and, accordingly, the commercial
desirability as well as the physical ability of generators to deliver into the
system. This impact cannot be ignored because to do so imposes both
potential reliability costs and economic costs on many other parties."5 6 These
factors, assert SDG&E, make it difficult to specify and use decentralized
information and allow decentralized trades in a strictly bilateral contract
system.
4.2.2 Bilateral contracts
A market based approach to the electric market benefits consumers
through the combined effect of two forces: 1) choice of service, which enables
a consumer to bargain for the terms of service which best fit his/her needs;
and 2) choice of supplier, which allows the consumer to get the best price for
the service he/she chooses. According to Enron, a centrally controlled market
offers the hope of multiple suppliers but not the choice among services which
is required for consumers to get the full benefit of an efficient market. In a
centralized market system, the government, the grid owner(s) or some other
organization would decide what types of physical delivery services the market
demands. On the other hand, the more participants engaging in bilateral
negotiations, the closer the product will meet the customers' needs.
In addition, argues Enron, the electric industry is susceptible to
product differentiation, and it is the power purchasers, particularly large
industrials freely operating in the marketplace, who can best distinguish
between suppliers based upon price and perceived reliability or ability to
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perform. Since these purchasers acquire virtually all of their raw materials
and energy under similar structures, they know which risks they are willing
to assume, what degree of reliability they require, and what they are willing to
pay for it. They can anticipate and prepare for supplier non-performance.
"To subject them to the decisions of central planners who do not possess
knowledge of their willingness and ability to assume risk is to rob them of the
ability to exercise their own informed judgment," states Enron.57
Furthermore, the company believes a centrally dispatched system wrongly
assumes all buyers and sellers have one philosophy, one set of needs, one
management, and one purpose.
Bilateral transactions, on the other hand, can offer additional
operational flexibility and can provide very rapid price convergence and a
high level of price transparency. Pacific Power is inclined to prefer
implementing retail competition with bilateral contracts because they provide
a means for a wide array of products and service offerings. With a spot-
market pool, there is competition to produce only a single commodity (even
in the presence of hedging contracts). Enron also insists that a mandatory
centralized pool will delay the introduction of market forces. A bilateral
market is already in place today and enormous quantities of firm and
economy energy are traded every day. In a decentralized model based on
bilateral arrangements, individual companies can take their existing
contractual commitments into account when they enter into new contracts.
The current system needs only more flexibility and more participants to
become more efficient and competitive. Enron maintains the centralized
pool approach "presents staggering implementation problems." It asks,
"What would the borders of the pool be? How would the Commission
exercise jurisdiction over the interstate phenomenon of grid operation? How
would existing sources under long-term, customer-specific contracts be
incorporated into the pool? How would existing interconnection
arrangements, interchange agreements, and pooling agreements be taken into
account?"5 8
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According to the FEA, all of the operational functions of a pool,
with the exception of "centralized dispatch" are currently provided by existing
control area operations and inter-control area coordination. A pool with
centralized dispatch would therefore not add anything to system reliability.
Many of the financial aspects are provided by utility control areas, by the
Western Systems Power Pool,59 or they could be provided by a separately
functioning futures market. "Thus, a centralized pool dispatch would not be
necessary to the development and performance of these aspects of market
operation." Though it acknowledges that the pool system provides some
economic benefits to consumers, the FEA believes "the ability of parties to
execute bilateral contracts outside of a pre-defined market structure is
extremely important in developing free and open competition and in
minimizing prices charged to customers."6 0
Many of the arguments against power pools are similar to those
against limiting competition to the wholesale level. According to the CLECA,
under POOLCO and the other "improved wholesale market" proposals, the
existing utility would continue to be the sole and exclusive supplier of
electricity to the end use customer. The utility could perhaps buy electricity
from addition suppliers at wholesale and while the functioning of the
wholesale market might be improved, the end use customer would still have
no choice as to his or her electricity supplier.
4.3 Compromise and "efficient direct access"
The CLECA believes direct access is dependent on neither bilateral
contracts nor pools. "In a transmission grid a node representing a municipal
utility is not distinguishable from a node representing a large industrial
customer. Either can be served under one or more bilateral agreements or
through a pool with contracts for differences..." It suggests that RTGs "will
59The WSPP functions as a regional power market, where individual transactions are
bilateral.
60FEA, 3rd round opening, p. 9.
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provide a framework for transmission access for bilateral arrangements and
also ultimately facilitate the development of a regional power pool."6 1 PG&E
believes that initial phases of direct access can be incorporated into the
utility's existing framework for grid operations. Bilateral agreements between
a direct access customer and the generator or marketer from which it is
purchasing electric power would be integrated into the utility's existing
dispatch procedure so that utility operators would be able to apply their
experience from bilateral wholesale transactions to the first retail bilateral
transactions. However, by the time all customers are eligible for direct access,
says PG&E, some kind of pool arrangement will be necessary to handle the
multitude of transactions that might occur.
According to Pacific Power, it is currently not possible to predict the
extent to which end users will have an interest in direct access or whether
they can do a better job of meeting their electricity requirements than utilities.
Pacific Power does not perceive a wholesale market to be separate from, or a
precursor to, the retail market that would be created by direct access. During
the transition period, utilities and some ultimate consumers would be
carrying on portfolio management activities in parallel and essentially
"shopping" in the same bulk power market. Assuming adequate protection
against cross-subsidization is in place, Pacific Power asserts that there does not
seem to be anything inherently unacceptable about a system in which some
classes of retail customers pursue direct access while others continue to
receive traditional utility service.
The Department of Energy (DOE) feels the debate between power
pools vs. bilateral contracts is "inappropriate because electric generation
supplied to an integrated transmission network is unavoidably pooled,
regardless of the extent of wholesale trade or the method by which parties
compensate each other for transactions. Thus, it is not a question of having a
pool or not having a pool; the question is whether there will be efficient
(least-cost) pooling or less efficient pooling."6 2 DOE contends that market-
based pools would achieve greater savings than centrally dispatched power
61 CLECA, 3rd round opening, p. 10
62Fourth Round Opening Comments of the United States Department of Energy (DOE),
August 24, 1994, p. 11.
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pools because dispatch would be based on price bids rather than on plant cost
information given to the control area operator. Generators would have a
stronger incentive than they currently do to minimize their operating costs
because recovery of their fixed costs would depend on the margin between the
pool spot price and the plant's average variable cost. Since the pool would be
open to all potential generators within the affected geographic area, spot
prices would decrease.
To DOE, it is not clear a priori whether direct access or wholesale
competition would provide the greatest benefits, but it says the CPUC does
not need to decide this question. It maintains that direct access as
traditionally conceived is essentially fictional. Except in rare circumstances,
no end-user could literally contract with an "alternative supplier" for its
electricity. Unless the customer were connected to a dedicated transmission
line to a single generating unit, the electricity delivered to the customer
would be drawn from some form of a pool, and the ultimate source of
electricity would be unknown. Further, unless the customer were to move to
another service area, he or she would remain linked to the local distribution
company as the means of obtaining electricity in a physical sense.
Instead, DOE relies on Dr. William Hogan's theory of "efficient
direct access", where customers can obtain the functional equivalent of direct
access if they can buy spot-priced electricity. A spot market can make the
contract market operate more efficiently by providing a financial mechanism
for reconciling differences in supply and demand in individual contracts.
The spot market supplies and sets prices for replacement power for any
generator that cannot meet its contractual obligations. It also facilitates
transactions that are not well suited to contractual arrangements, such as
short-term supply. The spot market also provides market signals for new
capacity, as well as allows the creation of secondary markets such as futures
trading.
Once a pool is established, the spot price seen by wholesale sellers
and wholesale buyers can also be provided to all retail customers. The
customer would have a two-part tariff. One part would be the pool-derived
spot price for electricity and the other part would reflect the local utility's fixed
costs of providing service. Once customers have access to a real-time spot
price, they can continue to buy electricity at that price, or enter into a hedging
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contract or contract for the difference with anyone they wish. According to
DOE, a customer could use a contract for differences to obtain the equivalent
of insurance coverage against unexpected fluctuations in the spot price.
These benefits could become available to even the smallest retail customers
through the development of standard contracts or service packages offered to
broad groups or associations of customers.63
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5 Issues
Implementation of the Commission's direct access programs may
encounter difficulties in light of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
(FERCs) jurisdiction over retail wheeling and the Energy Policy Act's
prohibition against FERC-ordered retail wheeling. In addition, competition
will inevitably require some form of rate increase during the transition
period. However, with the FERC's exclusive jurisdiction over transmission
rates, it is doubtful that the CPUC has power to impose a surcharge on service
rates. In addition, restructuring must take into account not only the technical
and organizational complexities inherent in the electric services industry, but
it must also ensure fair opportunity for all utilities to compete and ample
mechanisms for recovery of utility investments incurred under the existing
regulatory structure. At the same time, it must also satisfying such public
policy objectives as environmentally responsible energy conservation
programs and equity of benefit distribution among all consumer classes.
5.1 Regulatory authority
California cannot develop an unprecedented direct access program
without the FERC's active approval. The delineation of exactly which
unbundled services will be federally regulated and the allocation of costs
between federal and state rates must be determined. The Energy Policy Act of
1992 (EPAct) expressly precludes the FERC from requiring utilities to provide
transmission service to an ultimate customer and constrains the FERC's
authority to mandate retail wheeling from affecting the authority of any state
or local government to do so. Still, not everyone agrees that these restrictions
are an affirmative grant of state power to order retail wheeling.
Christine Alvarez, Commissioner of the Colorado Public Utilities
Commission observes: "The Federal Power Act (FPA) grants the FERC
jurisdiction to regulate transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce, and several Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that all
transmission of electric energy by utilities connected to the interstate
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transmission grid is transmission in interstate commerce."64 Even if states
are eventually found to have jurisdiction over retail wheeling, virtually all
wheeling is an interstate transaction because, except for a part of Texas, the
country's power grid is so interconnected that even transmission from a
utility to an end-user in the same state is considered to affect the nationwide
grid, and the FPA grants the FERC authority to determine just and reasonable
rates for the transmission of electricity in interstate commerce.65
DOE notes other federal constraints in addition to the FPA that
hinder the CPUC's proposals. For example, while the EPAct exempted
wholesale generators from the Public Utility Holding Company Act, it did not
extend the same immunity to generators making retail sales. "As a result,"
says DOE, "there will likely be fewer sellers in the retail market envisioned by
the Commission than there are in the wholesale market." Another federal
statute that might conflict with the CPUC proposal, according to DOE, is
PURPA. "Under the California proposal, investor-owned utilities would be
operating under the pressures of a competitive retail market but continue to
have an obligation to purchase under PURPA. In addition, new entrants to
the California retail market would also be subject to PURPA's obligation to
purchase power from qualifying facilities. The California proposal does not
appear to have considered how these requirements will be implemented." 6 6
In response to suggestions that the Commission may have
misinterpreted Congress' intentions, CPUC President Daniel Fessler says,
"Lamentably, it may ultimately require litigation to discern the proper
construction of what Congress did and did not say. We believe that there is
strong support for the position that the [CPUC] has the legal authority to order
direct access to retail customers." He maintains, "Even if a court were to find
that the savings clause is not an affirmative grant of authority, it would likely
view the savings clause as evidence of congressional intent to preserve state
64 Christine Alvarez, "1994 State Regulations' Forum," Public Utilities Fortnightly, November
15, 1994, p. 55.
65Frank Bryant, "EPACT aftermath: states begin to test waters of retail wheeling;
Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act of 1992," Energy User News, Vol. 19, No. 1
(January 1994), p. 1.
66
"DOE urges California panel to defer part of electricity rulemaking," Inside Energy/with
Federal Lands, June 13, 1994, p. 2.
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authority over retail wheeling."6 7 Nonetheless, According to FERC
Commissioner William Massey: "States that move ahead on retail wheeling
do so with full knowledge that they will almost certainly face court challenges
to their jurisdiction."6 8
Critics are concerned that non-utility and other generators not
currently regulated by the Commission will have the advantage of being able
to compete for retail customers currently served by California's investor-
owned utilities without opening their markets to equal competition. Still,
utilities are primarily worried that unilateral state action on retail wheeling
could put them at a competitive disadvantage with utilities from other
jurisdictions since these other utilities might not have to meet California's
demanding air pollution or energy diversity standards at generating facilities
in their home states.
For the most robust possible electric power market, "reciprocity"
requires that no utility or generator be allowed to directly or indirectly sell to a
customer in a CPUC-jurisdictional utility's service territory unless customers
in the selling utility's entire service territory, or in the territory in which a
non-utility generator is located, are likewise allowed to purchase and receive
electric power from a CPUC-jurisdictional utility if they so choose. Otherwise,
for example, a Nevada utility might be able to "cherry-pick California
customers with no opportunity for the California utility to do the same in
Nevada....That is an argument for federal regulation of the wires,"
acknowledges Massey.69 Commissioner Fessler suggests that, since outside
utilities will need transmission and distribution access into the California
systems, the California utilities might condition that access on reciprocal
rights. Still, it is possible that a state program could be found to interfere with
interstate commerce-thus implicating FERC jurisdiction.
Although the FPA allows creation of joint boards or joint hearings
between state and federal regulators to work out jurisdictional disputes,
neither approach is popular among the regulatory agencies, which generally
fear loss of jurisdictional control. Commissioner Fessler's request to DOE to
67
"CPUC'S Fessler returns fire in dispute over retail-wheeling authority," Inside F.E.R.C., June
27, 1994, p. 3.
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69Ibid., p. 1.
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suggest a mechanism along the lines of the FPA's joint hearings clause for
bringing federal regulators together with regulators in the California
marketplace was declined. Said DOE Assistant Secretary for Policy, Planning
and Program Evaluation Susan Tierney: "While saying that we share your
desire to cooperate and communicate regionally, we are still not sure what is
the right place for such a dialogue." In discussions with FERC and state
regulators, Tierney said she did not find anyone interested in the formal
meeting concept.70
5.2 Uneconomic investment
Transition to a more competitive market structure inevitably raises
the potential for uneconomic or "stranded" utility investment. Who will pay
the cost of the power plants that were constructed to serve all who require
service, but which now appear uneconomic when compared to competing
supplies? A significant amount of the power provided under existing
agreements with QFs will also be uneconomic throughout the agreements'
terms. For example, "...because both the purchases and the prices of existing
power purchase agreements were Commission-mandated, the above-market
cost of power purchases under these agreements must be included in a
transition charge borne by all customers connected to PG&E's system."71
Utility company investors complain that the Commission, and
even the utilities, have completely ignored the rights and needs of investors.
At a September 1994 public hearing in San Diego, Henry Fuchs commented,
"It's a strange proposal indeed when stockholders oppose management."
Speaking on behalf of a group of local investors, Vera Jewell explained that
many conservative older people had their nest eggs invested in utilities and
were counting on dividends to meet their daily needs. "We are not wealthy
individuals who can afford to lose our money," Jewell said.72
7 0 Mary O'Driscoll, "Fessler, Moler Look To Bridge Regulatory Gap, But Directions Differ," The
Energy Daily, October 20, 1994.
71 First Round Opening Comments of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), June 7, 1994,
p. 11.
72Janet Lowe, "Utility revamp evoking fears," San Diego Daily Transcript,
September 9, 1994, Sec. A, p 1.
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In addressing this issue, the Commission first relies on the fact that
a utility will be free to compete to retain its direct access customers under the
new unbundled tariffs. It can negotiate prices for generation services as long
as the rates do not exceed current tariffs or fall below marginal costs. In
addition, the Commission proposes a ratemaking device to distribute the
financial burden of increased competition and bypass between shareholders
and ratepayers. This device would identify the uneconomic portion of any
plant asset and allow the utility to recover that portion from all customers,
including direct access users, in the form of a "competition transition charge."
To measure the uneconomic portion of a plant asset, the
Commission suggests using the system marginal cost of generation as a
determinant of market value. "If the net difference between the utility's stock
of economic and uneconomic assets is positive, then there is a gain to be
distributed between consumers and shareholders. If the net difference is
negative, those losses would be reflected in the 'competition transition
charge' assessed to each customer's demand charge."7 3 In addition, the
Commission promises to account for any incremental risk that the direct
access proposal imposes on the utility in the next cost of capital proceeding.
The industrials have reacted disapprovingly to this plan, warning that
utilities would "lowball their system average costs in order to dump more of
the cost on wheelers. They prefer a market approach, in which a power plant
is 'uneconomic' if no one in the open market wants to buy power from it." 74
5.3 Public policy objectives
In a competitive market, the price of energy would be determined
from the negotiations of buyers and sellers, and not from any assumption
that services offered by renewable resources are more costly than other
services. Nevertheless, the aggregate investment in renewable technologies
that would occur in a more competitive setting might potentially be
insufficient to meet important public policy objectives such as maintaining
diversity of supply resources and technologies and minimizing aggregate
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emissions from electricity supply sources. Is it possible to have greater
competition and subsequently reduced rates while preserving the State's
aggressive pursuit of cost-effective demand-side management and important
public policy programs like low income ratepayer protection and
environmental preservation? Implementation of restructuring proposals
will necessarily require a delicate balancing of competing interests.
In addition, a major uncertainty in the debate over direct access is
the future of utilities' obligation to serve, which has been part of the long-
standing regulatory compact under traditional cost-of-service regulation. The
duty to serve currently requires a utility to provide service on demand under
rates, terms, and conditions approved by the Commission. Should utilities
retain this duty to serve consumers who have competitive alternatives? Is
access to electricity a universal necessity, and not a merely a commodity to be
bought and sold?
5.3.1 Environmental considerations
For the electric services industry, environmental objectives include
the promotion of fuel diversity, demand-side management, energy
conservation and renewable resources. In particular, demand-side
management (DSM) involves managing energy use on the customer side of
the meter. DSM activities can range from conservation measures to shifting
electricity use from peak to off-peak times and providing incentives for
customers to switch fuels (i.e., from electric heat to a gas-fired furnace). These
tactics can minimize total economic and environmental costs, while allowing
utilities to reliably meet their customers' energy service needs. Currently,
both participating and nonparticipating customers are surcharged in their
utility rates to fund energy efficiency and DSM programs. There has,
however, recently been some notable movement toward increased
responsibility for funding of these programs by the individual participants.
While wholesale and retail wheeling may boost efficiency and
lower prices, utility-sponsored DSM programs may not survive in an
environment where the lowest rate-opposed to the lowest cost service-is
the ultimate goal. In a planning paper, the Northwest Power Planning
Council warns, "[I]n competitive markets, wholesale or retail, suppliers will
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have little incentive to account for non-market or unregulated
environmental costs if doing so will make their near-term costs less
competitive relative to other suppliers who might be able to avoid accounting
for such costs."75 Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), who wrote provisions in
the EPAct to expand wholesale access to utility transmission systems echoes
the Natural Resources Defense Council and other environmental groups:
"Because DSM programs boost energy efficiency, consumers often enjoy
smaller monthly bills despite facing the higher rates made necessary to cover
the programs' cost ....Retail wheeling would unravel the efficiency gains
resulting from IRP because the emphasis would shift to rates alone, rather
than efficiency and least cost planning." 76
In response, free enterprise advocates insist that the marketplace
can be relied upon to produce incentives for energy efficient behavior on the
part of end-use consumers as well as the producers themselves. ELCON
questions the utilities' ability to cost-effectively measure and verify the level
and persistence of any real savings achieved with energy efficiency and DSM
programs. It states: "Domestic and global competition is an extremely
powerful and effective motivator to maximize the efficient use of all
resources-not just energy. Many ELCON members also produce and market
products that enable other end-users to use energy more efficiently."77
In fact, contends ELCON, end-users are discouraged from investing in energy
efficiency improvements because of such imperfections as "inappropriate rate
designs, billing practices that disguise the price signal, abuses associated with
fuel adjustment mechanisms, cross-class subsidies, ineffective utility
marketing programs, and the corporate culture of a regulated industry."7 8
The market could instead create powerful incentives for the
development of new technologies that maximize the throughput of the grid
and thus avoid the siting of new transmission corridors. A competitive
market could also encourage utilities to repower existing generating facilities
75Daniel Kaplan, "Northwest Planning Council Sees Bleak Future For Renewables,
Conservation," The Energy Daily, February 16, 1994.
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to extend the economic lives of those units. ELCON believes competition can
eliminate all "barriers" to cost-effective energy improvements. "In general, a
competitive electric services industry will more efficiently determine the
appropriate level of fuel and technology diversity because markets do a better
job identifying and managing risks and costs ....There is greater compatibility
between market-based mechanisms for environmental control and a
competitive electric services industry, and therefore, more cost-effective
compliance strategies can be achieved by a restructured industry.
Competition forces the most cost-effective compliance with environmental
laws because shareholders, as opposed to captive ratepayers, assume all risk
associated with noncompliance." 79
5.3.2 Social interests
Consumer advocates are apprehensive that if the Commission's
plan is implemented as proposed, it will give an unfair head start to larger
consumers of electricity, who will have the opportunity to lock in the lowest-
priced electricity for themselves, leaving the smaller consumers-primarily
residential consumers-with the highest-priced electricity. A competitive
wholesale power pool could alleviate this concern by offering equal and
immediate access to all customer segments, but this solution has its
advantages and disadvantages, as discussed in chapter 4.
There are also objections that only consumers-and not utility
shareholders-are called on to pay for expensive nuclear power plants and
other investments that would become uneconomical in a competitive retail
power market. At the September public hearing, Edward Dunean of San
Diego said, "The big users will walk away with all the benefits." Bruce Patton,
a small-business operator from Vista, agreed and used telephone company
destructuring as an example. "I'm still trying to figure out what I'm paying
for (on my telephone bill), but I do know it's a lot more than I paid before."
Another man held up copies of his one-page electric bill and his eight-page
telephone bill and defied the commissioner to tell him what the various
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telephone charges represented and which moneysaving "plan" he should
use.8 0
Greater competition in the electric industry also implies that, as
utilities are forced to unbundle their product, the customers will face more
complex choices and more complex bills than they may be ready for. At the
September hearing, "several individuals expressed fear that the quality of
service may deteriorate with a confusing array of providers and a more
complex method of delivery. In addition, some feared that by introducing
out-of-state, low-cost providers, California may stop producing its own
electricity and could lose its self-sufficiency." Fuchs described as "laughable"
the concept that individual consumers should go shopping for electricity the
way they might buy clothing or groceries. "He cautioned the commissioners
to remember that electricity is a commodity that people can't do without and
yet even under ideal circumstances, have little control over. Citizens rely on
the PUC, he said, to ensure that society has access to electric power." 81
Furthermore, the possibility of retail wheeling changes the long-
standing pact between utilities and their regulators. In exchange for accepting
a specified rate of return on investment, electric utilities had agreed to serve
all customers in their territory at approved rates. Under the restructuring,
utilities would retain their traditional obligation to serve customers who
continue to receive bundled, tariffed utility service. With respect to direct
access customers, however, the duty would be modified to avoid seriously
hampering a utility's ability to plan for and reliably serve its remaining
customers. "Accordingly, the Commission proposes that utilities be
permitted to require a 12-month notice period for direct access customers who
wish to return to bundled service status. The utility must provide generation
service in less than 12 months, but may charge the full cost of arranging
incremental supplies to serve the customer. Finally, the returning customer
must also provide the utility with 12 months' notice before it can once again
return to direct access status."82
8 0Lowe, Sec. A, p 1.
8 1Ibid., Sec. A, p. 1.
82Phillip S. Cross, "Retail Wheeling-Happy Motoring for State Regulators?" Public Utilities
Fortnightly, Vol. 132, No. 12 (June 15, 1994), p. 46.
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Increased competition should not affect lifeline rates for the
economically disadvantaged, economic development programs for
businesses, and development of zero-emission vehicles. The question is
whether or not the utilities should be the principal agents charged with
designing, implementing, and funding these programs. Instead, the costs
could be transferred to the state's general fund or a combination of tax
revenues and special fees applicable to all consumers of electric services, such
as an "end user surcharge." "To address this concern immediately, the
Commission proposes to establish a separate line item reflecting such costs as
part of each consumer's demand charge."83 Other possibilities include
government-mandated efficiency programs, regulatory incentives offered to
utilities who assist their customers with DSM and private sector programs,
such as the already existent energy efficient mortgage.
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6 Conclusions
At this point in the restructuring debate, many important questions
remain unanswered. In addition to the disagreement concerning the scope of
competition appropriate for the electric services industry, there are varied
opinions as to the most effective implementation. Issues of regulatory
jurisdiction and public policy also need to be resolved. Furthermore, the role
of municipal utilities is ambiguous. Although the CPUC does not regulate
municipals, these utilities transmit much of their power on IOU lines and are
interested in the impact of the OIR on wholesale-power and debt markets.
"Some also fear their customers will clamor for open-access rights, stranding
the supply portfolios that they have carefully assembled."84
Various IOUs have already offered plans to reduce the cost of their
generation to market levels over a defined period. If distributed systems
become successful and economically competitive market options, electricity
suppliers of the future may be offering a package of energy services-a
combination of kWh and end-use efficiency optimized for a particular end-
user. Although the final manifestation of a competitive electric services
industry is unknown at the moment, it is almost certain that "high cost
utilities will face dramatic challenges that may cost some of them their
independence. Either consolidations or bankruptcies will be the outcome for
those high-cost producers that cannot quickly restructure into lower cost
suppliers of services."85
Nonetheless, one of the most consistent arguments throughout this
entire restructuring debate has been the need for an industry that can
accommodate individualized needs with an array of differentiated electric
services. Perhaps an answer lies in identifying like concerns and then
tailoring specific solutions to address them. Physical constraints prevent the
complete decentralization of the electric service utility industry. Some sort of
pooling is currently in place and, from necessity, will continue to exist. The
critical question is whether or not the independent system operator will
function only in a managerial capacity, or as a market for measuring costs and
determining prices.
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The strengths and weaknesses of the various proposals have been
described in detail, and the task now lies in matching strengths with
particular needs in such a way as to compensate for the weaknesses as well as
reply to the relevant issues involved. The electric service utility industrial
structure will continue to be shaped by a combination of market and
technological forces. Nevertheless, for purposes of this discussion, generation
will be assumed to be largely competitive, while transmission and
distribution will be understood to remain as monopoly systems subject to
government regulation.
Although all consumers, regardless of size, have a stake in seeing
reduced electricity rates, large industrial customers in particular complain
that the high cost of energy significantly affects operations, sales, and
productivity. These customers-because of their comparatively greater
magnitude of investment as well as advanced degree of sophistication and
experience in dealing with the market-might be better able to embrace
competitive retail direct access than average residential users. Their load
characteristics and transmission requirements also give industrials the
leverage to essentially participate at the "wholesale" level, along with small
utilities. Since this sector of consumers is wary of the loss of autonomy
associated with power pools, operational flexibility and product
differentiation could be preserved through an improved system of bilateral
and multilateral contracts. Still, technical limitations demand that there still
be some third party system operator to manage control area services, and with
an increasing number of independent transactions, some kind of pool
arrangement might become necessary in the future.
As for the residential sector, critics worry about the possibility of an
unmanageably complex system of obtaining electric service, and rightly so.
While large firms might be able to create "power portfolios" and monitor
locational spot prices for electricity in order to find the best rates, it is
impractical as well as unreasonable to impose the same demands on small
businesses and individual consumers. People may be able to choose whether
or not to become direct access customers, but for those who opt to continue
receiving bundled, tariffed utility service, who will protect their interests and
ensure that they are not lost in the restructuring process? For this class of
consumers, wholesale competition executed through a power pool may be
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more appropriate. Just as cable TV viewers contract with companies for
transmission service of a particular array of programs-and not with each
individual programmer-homeowners and storekeepers should be able to
rely on some middle-ground service provider to arrange for their electricity
needs. Other than perhaps a schedule of rates based on time-of-use, all of the
detailed issues concerning load flows and pricing schemes should be
completely transparent to these end-users.
Amidst all of the dialogue on restructuring and deregulation, it is
also interesting to step back and consider the participants. Utilities want less
government intervention and more competition to cut their costs, expand
their customer base, and potentially increase their profits. Consumers hope
that market forces will drive down inflated energy prices and make power
more affordable. Special interest groups want to safeguard the public welfare
as well as the environment. In addition to these expected players, however,
there is another class of parties that has been watching the debate very closely.
It is composed of the marketers or "power brokers" who hope to get a
foothold in the business of facilitating transactions and customizing electric
services. Although some might accuse and subsequently condemn them for
seeking to capitalize on the restructuring debate, these individuals will in fact
be necessary intermediaries between energy buyers and sellers in the case of a
contract environment. In a more aggregated pool scenario, their roles might
still be significant, albeit likely diminished.
In any case, the OIR proposes that direct access begin as soon as
January 1, 1996 for large industrial customers (those with transmission levels
above 50 kilovolts). Other customer segments, including the residential
sectors, would then be phased in through 2002. Although the three major
California IOUs are less optimistic about the CPUC schedule, the necessary
duration for the transition period is unclear. Edison would simply like to go
more slowly. SDG&E would like to lengthen the transition period to 2005,
and PG&E suggests a target year of 2008-primarily to deal with costs of
accelerating the depreciation of its stranded investments.
As understanding of the relevant issues improves through the
further clarification and assessment of policies, the schedule for regulatory
reform should be adjusted accordingly. The Commission needs to seriously
reevaluate its goals for a competitive electricity market and examine who the
61
beneficiaries of "direct access" in its current form will actually be. The
benefits of reduced power rates must be weighed against the possibilities of
undermining energy conservation efforts, of crippling emergency power
services, and of further disenfranchising the economically disadvantaged. All
of the concerned organizations participating in the electric services
restructuring forum must continue to invest the time and effort required to
develop the market arrangements required for efficient and effective
competition. In order for competition to accomplish the objective of reducing
costs to consumers, progress should advance on an incremental basis and
incorporate into the process any knowledge gained as it becomes available.
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7 Sources
Many of the Electricity Restructuring Forum documents used in preparing
this thesis were accessed via a gopher site on the Internet. The relevant
gopher item information follows:
Name: 'Electric Restructuring Forum'
Type: 1 (directory)
Host: 'nic.cpuc.ca.gov'
(Computer where information is maintained)
Port: 70
(Network connection port)
Path: '1/ERF'
(Tells host where to find the information)
Note: Not all of the electronically formatted documents included page
numbers. Therefore, throughout the course of the thesis, references to those
papers are listed without such citations.
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